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Abstract
Security and ethics are both core to ensuring that
a machine learning system can be trusted. In
production machine learning, there is generally
a hand-off from those who build a model to those
who deploy a model. In this hand-off, the engi-
neers responsible for model deployment are of-
ten not privy to the details of the model and thus,
the potential vulnerabilities associated with its us-
age, exposure, or compromise. Techniques such
as model theft, model inversion, or model mis-
use may not be considered in model deployment,
and so it is incumbent upon data scientists and
machine learning engineers to understand these
potential risks so they can communicate them to
the engineers deploying and hosting their mod-
els. This is an open problem in the machine
learning community and in order to help allevi-
ate this issue, automated systems for validating
privacy and security of models need to be de-
veloped, which will help to lower the burden of
implementing these hand-offs and increasing the
ubiquity of their adoption.
1. Current Landscape
Today, there are well-understood frameworks both
for detailing model characteristics (Mitchell et al.,
2019; Arnold et al., 2019) and documenting
datasets (Gebru et al., 2018; Holland et al., 2018). These
are widely cited as mechanisms to bring more transparency,
auditing, and trust to machine learning. However, adoption
has lagged behind and the open problem is why adoption
has failed to catch on.
*Equal contribution 1Montreal AI Ethics Institute, Mon-
treal, Quebec, Canada 2Microsoft Corporation, Redmond, WA,
USA 3Rapid7, Boston, MA, USA. Correspondence to: Mon-
treal AI Ethics Institute <abishek@montrealethics.ai and er-
ick@montrealethics.ai>.
Proceedings of the 37 th International Conference on Machine
Learning Workshop on Challenges in Deploying and monitoring
Machine Learning Systems, Vienna, Austria, PMLR 119, 2020.
Copyright 2020 by the author(s).
We hypothesize that the reason is that these pieces of docu-
mentation are too onerous to create in practice. Specifically,
creation of this sort of documentation is a highly manual
process and even in cases where these documents are pro-
duced, the value is quite small given the lack of standard-
ization, practical value, and fragmented understanding of
the utility of such documentation (Thomas & Tilley, 2001).
People are not likely to create documentation for documen-
tation’s sake, especially if there is no enforcement mecha-
nism, so we must consider automated processes that help
to ease the burden and are deeply integrated into existing
development and deployment workflows.
As an illustrative example - many machine learning sys-
tems are vulnerable to adversarial examples. Although
awareness is relatively high due to the high profile of
some research published on the topic (Athalye et al., 2017;
Carlini & Wagner, 2017; Athalye et al., 2018) there re-
mains limited adoption of techniques to mitigate these is-
sues. Moreover, very few model APIs incorporate mean-
ingful input validation or sanitization other than verify-
ing that the input has valid dimensions. This can lead to
exploitation of vulnerabilities in machine learning frame-
works (Stevens et al., 2017). The risks to models need to be
better understood by the data scientists and machine learn-
ing engineers who build the models, as well as the engi-
neers who deploy the models into production.
2. Continuous Integration of Ethical
Principles
We propose that integration of ethical and security prin-
ciples via MLFlow 1 or some other automated tool into
the ML development lifecycle can ease adoption and en-
sure these same principles are put into practice rather than
merely discussed in hypothetical scenarios. Existing tools
like Deon 2 allow for easy and semi-automated checking
of ethical concerns via configurable mechanisms including
data storage, modeling, and deployment. Often in DevOps,
it is these “blue lights and green boxes” from CI/CD tools
that are looked for to ensure that a product can be trusted for
1http://mlflow.org
2https://deon.drivendata.org/
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use (Duvall et al., 2007) rather than an analysis of the asso-
ciated documentationwhich has a higher burden in terms of
resources and time required to parse them. We predict that
similar principles would hold in ML deployments whereby
indicators with low cognitive load requirementswill help to
guide developers and consumers on the trustworthiness of
those systems when it comes to vulnerability to adversarial
attacks. Just as higher trust is placed in those open-source
repositories that have badges with passing build status, high
code-coverage, and more (Trockman et al., 2018), we posit
that such indicators will usher a focus on ML systems that
emphasize these practices.
3. Vulnerabilities in Model Development
Vulnerabilities in model development occur when a creator
does not work to mitigate bugs in the underlying structure
of the model. This can be quite challenging as so often, the
vulnerabilities are:
• Unknown
• Difficult to test for
• Difficult to exploit
If we automate the process of testing for these bugs or can
use an algorithmic impact assessment (Calvo et al., 2020)
to determine the potential risks associated with deployment
and use, then better decisions can be made about whether
some defense needs to be built into the model or the sur-
rounding software infrastructure. This extends beyond tra-
ditional cybersecurity practices which are often woefully
underprepared for the new attack surfaces that are opened
up due to the integration of machine learning into the sys-
tem. To wit, researchers at Microsoft (Siva Kumar et al.,
2020) found that in a survey of 28 companies, including 10
cybersecurity companies, 22 of them did nothing to secure
their ML systems, demonstrating this endemic problem.
4. Vulnerabilities in Model Deployment
Many of the model vulnerabilities today are not actually
incurred in development - they occur at deployment time.
Much of data science is performed in notebooks, and there
is a real reproducibility crisis, especially in the way how
notebooks are used (Lyu et al., 1996). When it comes time
to deploy a model, those in charge of infrastructure remain
focused on uptime, availability, and scalability (Lyu, 2007).
Though infrastructure engineers are aware of general secu-
rity best practices, the unique threat landscape of machine
learning is often alien to them, and even to security practi-
tioners (Kumar et al., 2020).
5. Mind the Gap
Since adoption of existing frameworks is limited due to im-
plementation friction, we have a gap between the ideals
of deploying ethical, robust, and trustworthy ML and the
practical reality of deploying ML systems. There are very
few concrete standards to which ML systems adhere, and
integrating those into the development processes can help
move us toward these goals. To move from theory into prac-
tice, we need to build a framework that allows for seamless
integration into the design, development, and deployment
workflows which will:
• achieve ubiquity in adoption
• create standards which allow for cross-
implementation comparisons
• evoke community-driven collaboration to build up se-
curity best practices in this domain
6. Future Research
Moving forward, we will need to build a prototype of this
applied framework and test it with beachhead organizations
to gather evidence on the efficacy of the approach. We be-
lieve that there is potential to leverage existing frameworks
such as the ones mentioned in section 2 especially such that
it reduces the friction of integration and adoption of com-
pletely new tools for this purpose.
A method of “risk scoring” for models will need to be
developed, which will also require standardization of def-
initions across the machine learning security community.
Some preliminary work has been done on creating an ex-
posure metric for unintended memorization in neural net-
works (Carlini et al., 2018), but the focus there is extremely
limited and a broader concept of risk scoring is needed to
ensure that deployedML systems are protected from adver-
sarial attacks, model theft (Tramr et al., 2016), and model
inversion (Fredrikson et al., 2015).
7. Conclusion
Development and deployment of secure, trustworthy mod-
els is an open problem which plagues the machine learning
community. Current methods for ensuring the security and
trust of models are too onerous to ensure adoption, leading
to the current gap between ideation and adoption. Defin-
ing roles and responsibilities for safeguarding the confiden-
tiality of data along with the integrity and availability of
models will be crucial for solving this problem and creat-
ing robust, ethical, and trustworthy production-grade mod-
els. In order to facilitate this, a seamless framework, in-
tegrated into existing development and deployment work-
flows, for conducting risk assessments must be developed
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to ease adoption.
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